Last update: October 1, 2026 · latest polls included: Real Time Big Data, fieldwork ending September 30 · 78 first-round polls · 20,000 reproducible simulations
How the result comes together. Lula wins outright in 11.6% of scenarios, Flávio in 3.6%: Lula starts from 44.1%, 5.9 points short of a majority, Flávio from 40.5%. If the runoff happens, Lula wins it in 47.4% of cases. Overall: 51.8% for Lula, 48.2% for Flávio.
| Candidate | Centre | 90% | First | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Lula PT | 44.1% | 35.8 to 51.9 | 64.0% | |
| Flávio Bolsonaro PL | 40.5% | 31.5 to 49.2 | 36.0% | |
| Augusto Cury Avante | 4.5% | 1.6 to 7.9 | < 1% | |
| Renan Santos Missão | 3.9% | 1.9 to 7.7 | < 1% | |
| Ronaldo Caiado PSD | 3.3% | 1.0 to 6.3 | < 1% | |
| Romeu Zema Novo | 1.3% | 0.4 to 2.6 | < 1% | |
| Six other candidates | 2.3% | 0.1 to 6.3 | < 1% |
Lula finishes first in 64.0% of scenarios, Flávio Bolsonaro in 36.0%. The third candidate, Augusto Cury, stands at 4.5% and does not exceed 7.9% in 95% of cases, while Flávio does not fall below 31.5%. The model therefore assumes a Lula vs Flávio Bolsonaro runoff, the only pairing consistent with the polls.
Chances of winning if the runoff takes place. In 90% of cases Lula's share falls between 39.1% and 60.0%. A candidate who outperforms in the first round carries an edge into the runoff.
Probability of winning the October 25 runoff if it takes place, recomputed every two days since June. At his highest, Lula stood at 57.3% on July 29; at his lowest, 47.3% on September 29. Today: Lula 47.4%, Flávio Bolsonaro 52.6%.
Polling centre. If this runoff took place, Lula would win in 56.9% of cases.
Polling centre. If this runoff took place, Lula would win in 64.1% of cases.
Polling centre. If this runoff took place, Lula would win in 76.9% of cases.
Polling centre. If this runoff took place, Lula would win in 78.2% of cases.
Lula is above 50% in each of the other measured runoffs. They remain hypothetical: none of these candidates reaches the runoff in the model’s scenarios.
Share of the leading candidate in each state, in valid votes. 2026 projection: built from the 2022 result and state and regional polls, consistent with the model's national centre. It is indicative: the election is decided nationally, every vote counting the same whatever the state. 2022 result: Superior Electoral Court.
From January to September, Lula moves from 39.9% to 40.5% of published first-round intentions, Flávio Bolsonaro from 29.3% to 37.8%. In the runoff, Lula's share moves from 51.9% to 49.6%. 121 first-round and 120 runoff polls, taken from Wikipedia's public tables.
At its highest, Lula reaches 66.1% on July 29. On October 1, he stands at 51.8%, Flávio Bolsonaro at 48.2%.
A candidate who wins an absolute majority of valid votes, excluding blank and spoiled ballots, is elected in the first round. Otherwise the top two meet in a runoff. In 2026 the first round is on October 4 and the runoff, if needed, on October 25. President and vice-president run on a single ticket for a four-year term, with one consecutive re-election allowed.
Voting is compulsory from 18 to 70 and optional at 16 and 17, over 70 and for illiterate voters. It uses electronic voting machines: the national result is known the same evening. In 2022 Lula won 48.43% in the first round and 50.90% in the runoff.
The Superior Electoral Court approved twelve candidacies. Pablo Marçal’s (PRTB) was rejected; the party asked to replace him with Leonardo Avalanche, a substitution not yet ruled on at the time of calculation. Polls do not test him separately: if approved, his support is already within the other-candidates line, at most 1%.
Two questions, in this order. Can the incumbent, Lula, pass 50% on October 4? He stands at 44.1% of valid votes. And if not, who wins the October 25 runoff against Flávio Bolsonaro, which the 16 pollsters show as tied?
| Region | 2022 | 2026 | Change | Pollsters |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Northeast | 69.3 % | 63.3 % | -6.0 | Datafolha, Futura, Nexus, Quaest |
| Southeast | 45.7 % | 46.6 % | +0.9 | Datafolha, Futura, Nexus, Quaest |
| South | 38.2 % | 36.9 % | -1.3 | Datafolha, Futura, Nexus, Quaest |
| North and Centre-West | 44.5 % | 44.8 % | +0.3 | Datafolha, Nexus, Quaest |
| State | Weight | 2022 | 2026 | Change | Polls |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| São Paulo | 21.8 % | 44.8 % | 45.9 % | +1.1 | Datafolha, Quaest |
| Minas Gerais | 10.4 % | 50.2 % | 49.5 % | -0.7 | Datafolha, Quaest |
| Rio de Janeiro | 8.1 % | 43.5 % | 45.1 % | +1.6 | Datafolha, Quaest |
| Bahia | 7.1 % | 72.1 % | 69.7 % | -2.4 | Quaest |
| Paraná | 5.6 % | 37.6 % | 37.8 % | +0.2 | Quaest |
| Rio Grande do Sul | 5.6 % | 43.7 % | 43.2 % | -0.5 | Quaest |
| Ceará | 4.6 % | 70.0 % | 68.6 % | -1.4 | Quaest |
| Pernambuco | 4.6 % | 66.9 % | 69.3 % | +2.4 | Datafolha, Quaest |
| Group | 2026 | Pollsters |
|---|---|---|
| Evangelicals | 34.3 % | Datafolha, Nexus, Quaest |
| Catholics | 55.6 % | Datafolha, Nexus, Quaest |
| Cities and metropolitan areas | 54.3 % | Datafolha, Nexus |
| Interior | 48.6 % | Datafolha, Nexus |
In national polls, Lula's decline is concentrated in the Northeast: 63.3% of the runoff against 69.3% in 2022. Polls taken within Northeastern states, on larger samples, show a smaller decline. Elsewhere he roughly holds his 2022 positions, which is enough to explain the close runoff. The South remains the right's stronghold, evangelicals vote two to one for Flávio Bolsonaro, and the more agricultural interior leans his way while large cities stay with Lula. State polls are those by Quaest and Datafolha released between September 22 and 28.
| Voters of | Quaest | Datafolha | Nexus | Average |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Augusto Cury | 25 / 41 | 33 / 35 | 30 / 44 | 29 / 40 |
| Renan Santos | 18 / 50 | 14 / 54 | 8 / 56 | 13 / 53 |
| Ronaldo Caiado | 20 / 46 | 33 / 50 | 36 / 30 | 30 / 42 |
| Romeu Zema | 38 / 32 | – | 13 / 59 | 26 / 46 |
Lula / Flávio Bolsonaro, as % of each candidate's voters. Quaest 9/10-13, Datafolha 9/22-23, Nexus 9/18-20; small bases, wide margins of error. Augusto Cury is the third man, at 4.5% at the model centre: his voters lean towards Flávio Bolsonaro but are the least settled, only half say their choice is final. If he outperforms, he decides the runoff.
As in electoral law, figures on this page are shares of valid votes: blank, null and undecided answers are removed from voting intentions.
In the polls, blank, null and undecided answers average 8.6%, from 1.6% to 15.7% by pollster. Four voters in five say their choice is final (Quaest 79%, Datafolha 80%, Nexus 84%); minor candidates' voters are the least settled. In Nexus, 91% of voters say they will vote and 5% probably will. In 2022, abstention reached 20.9% in the first round and blank and null votes 4.4% of voters. A record abstention only changes the outcome if it hits one side more than the other: no published data measures that so far.
Approval and rejection: Datafolha, September 22-23. The incumbent camp lost ground in the runoff in each of the last four presidential elections, 3.9 points on average. In 2022, Jair Bolsonaro lost 6.0 points in the runoff compared with 2018, with inflation at 10%. Lula's three runoffs all ended about 9 points below his ceiling, 100 minus his rejection rate.
| Issue | Priority | Government balance | Indicators |
|---|---|---|---|
| Security | 31 % | -21 | homicides : de 23,4 à 19,1 pour 100 000 entre 2022 et 2025, en amélioration |
| Economy and prices | 16 % | -26 | chômage 5,4 % (9,3 en 2022), inflation 4,4 % (10,1), alimentation 3,4 % (14,7), revenu réel +2,8 % ; défaut des ménages 5,8 % (3,7) |
| Health | 14 % | -14 | pas d'indicateur de délai d'attente |
| Corruption | 14 % | -16 | fraude à l'INSS (avril 2025, gouvernement) ; Banco Master (enquête de juillet 2026, Flávio Bolsonaro) |
| Poverty | 13 % | -8 | Bolsa Família : 19,3 millions de familles |
| Education | 7 % | -3 | pas d'indicateur retenu |
Priority: share of voters naming the issue as the main problem (Quaest, August 30 to September 1). Balance: good minus bad ratings of the government on the issue (Ipec, June; for corruption, the Lula-Flávio gap on 'most corrupt', Datafolha, May). On security and the economy, indicators have improved since 2022 while perception stays negative: sentiment is harsher than reality.
| Election | Actual winner | Chances given to the winner | Finalists seen at D-10 | Runoff within 80% / 90% |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2002 | Lula | 83.1% | yes | yes / yes |
| 2006 | Lula | 95.2% | yes | yes / yes |
| 2010 | Dilma Rousseff | 97.9% | yes | yes / yes |
| 2014 | Dilma Rousseff | 84.0% | no | yes / yes |
| 2018 | Jair Bolsonaro | 49.6% | yes | yes / yes |
| 2022 | Lula | 67.0% | yes | yes / yes |
The winner was the favourite 5 times out of 6. In 2018, the model gave 49.6% to Jair Bolsonaro, the actual winner. A near coin toss, in an election upended by the knife attack on the candidate. In 2014, polls had Marina Silva second ten days out: the model missed Aécio Neves's qualification but made Dilma Rousseff the winner. In the first round, 8 of 12 finalist scores fall within the 80% interval, 9 within the 90% interval. In the runoff, 6 of 6 within the 90% interval. Brier score on the winner: 0.070 over the 6 elections (0 is perfect, 0.25 is a coin toss). Six elections are still few to judge calibration.
| Lula PT | 48.43% | |
| Jair Bolsonaro PL | 43.20% | |
| Simone Tebet MDB | 4.16% | |
| Ciro Gomes PDT | 3.04% | |
| Others | 1.17% |
A forecasting model is not one more poll. A poll surveys a sample and describes opinion at a given moment. A model surveys no one. It gathers what can be measured, published polls, past election results and the campaign context, and derives a distribution of possible outcomes with their probability. It does not say a candidate will get 44%. It says within which range they will finish, and how likely they are to win.
Two pollsters publishing on the same day can differ by several points. The model aggregates every poll registered with the Superior Electoral Court, giving more weight to the most recent, the largest and the pollsters that erred least in the past. It then anchors stated opinion in the vote actually cast at the last presidential election, and takes the context into account: the incumbent's approval, the economy, the issues dominating the campaign.
Brazilian polls have missed at every presidential election, sometimes by a lot. The model replays those real errors on today's polls, in either direction: it does not assume in advance that one camp will be underestimated. This is what gives each candidate their range and their chance of winning outright.
The runoff starts from directly polled head-to-heads, which already contain the vote transfers of first-round electorates. It then moves with the first round: a candidate who surprises on October 4 starts the runoff on October 25 with an edge.
A single forecast would give a false sense of certainty. The model therefore replays the election twenty thousand times, varying what is genuinely uncertain: polling error, the gap between pollsters, the movement between the two rounds. The probability shown is the share of simulations in which the event happens.
Uncertainty is this model’s product, never its flaw. The simulations are reproducible, and the model was replayed on the six presidential elections from 2002 to 2022 without any parameter being adjusted afterwards.
Election results: Superior Electoral Court. Historical polls: Datafolha reports, public tables and Brazilian press for 2002 to 2022. 2026 polls: surveys registered with the Superior Electoral Court and published by pollsters. Context: IBGE, Central Bank of Brazil, pollsters for approval and campaign issues.
Excluded: American Analytics (9/15 to 9/20), whose published registration number has an invalid format.
All rights belong to Le Millénaire SAS, 47 rue de Vivienne, 75002 Paris.
Model designed by
Project director: William Thay
Deputy project director: Pierre Clairé
Political analysis and data: Matthieu Hocque
Data analysis, mathematics and validation: Florian Gérard-Mercier